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Cet article souligne les difficultés rencontrées par les petites provinces dans la
Fédération canadienne, en examinant les efforts déployés dans les années 1940 par
le premier ministre Walter Jones, de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard, pour développer le
commerce de bovins vivants de sa province avec Terre-Neuve. Bien que l’Île-du-
Prince-Édouard ait été bien placée pour répondre à la demande croissante de bœuf à
Terre-Neuve pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la pénurie de moyens d’expédition
se révéla un problème majeur. Même lorsque des lignes de commerce maritime
subventionnées furent mises en place, elles ignorèrent les relations commerciales
inter-insulaires préexistantes, de sorte que les intérêts maritimes du Canada central
bénéficièrent autant des décisions d’Ottawa que les producteurs bovins de l’Île-du-
Prince-Édouard.
This paper highlights the difficulties faced by small provinces in the Canadian
federation by examining the efforts of Premier Walter Jones of Prince Edward Island
to develop his province’s live beef-cattle trade with Newfoundland during the 1940s.
Although Prince Edward Island was well placed to meet the escalating demand for
beef in Newfoundland during the Second World War, the lack of shipping capacity
proved to be a major problem. Even when subsidized shipping was secured, it ignored
pre-existing, inter-island trade relationships and, as a result, central Canadian
shipping interests benefited as much from Ottawa’s decisions as did Prince Edward
Island cattle producers.
ONCE IT BECAME APPARENT that the Allies would win the Second World War,
governments across Canada turned their attention to post-war planning. Memories of
the recession that followed the First World War remained fresh and the provinces,
determined to avoid a repeat performance of that economic collapse, commissioned
numerous studies on how best to maintain the booming level of wartime production
during the transition to a peacetime economy. Most of these studies called for
increased provincial industrial capacity, improved distribution of hydro-electricity
and a reintegration of returning veterans into the workforce. Although the provinces
were in broad agreement on what was required to ensure continued prosperity, Prince
Edward Island’s reconstruction program was unique in one respect: it was the only
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province to specifically endorse increased trade with Newfoundland as a part of its
reconstruction plans.1
This article examines the efforts by Prince Edward Island Liberal Premier Walter
Jones to expand trade with Newfoundland and Labrador during and immediately after
the Second World War. Such an examination reveals much about the difficulties faced
by small provinces in the Canadian federation. While Jones was eager to see Prince
Edward Island producers take advantage of the wartime demand in the nearby British
colony and long-time trading partner, he was hindered by hardball negotiations with
Ottawa and St. John’s and by a federal bureaucracy that sent mixed messages to
Charlottetown. Ottawa, pressed by wartime shortages, offered Islanders privileged
access to the Newfoundland cattle market, but was slow to help them secure the
shipping capacity that was required to take advantage of their preferential status. That
the problems persisted after the war’s end suggests that more than wartime exigencies
dictated federal shipping policy. Jones was not, of course, the first or the last Maritime
premier to experience frustrations with Ottawa, but his spirited campaign to secure
regular shipping service to Newfoundland during and after the Second World War
provides an example of extraordinary initiative in the face of daunting odds.2
In focusing on trade with Newfoundland, Walter Jones was not just following a
pipe dream. The two islands had a longstanding, although largely undocumented,
trading partnership. In the late-18th and early-19th centuries Newfoundland buyers
gave breadth to the nascent Prince Edward Island shipbuilding industry by
guaranteeing shipbuilders who sold to nearby Newfoundland a quick return on
investment.3 Moreover, Newfoundland, with its limited agricultural potential, relied
heavily on imported foodstuffs – a significant proportion of which came from PEI.
While it may have been exaggerating to make a point, the Prince Edward Island
Gazette, on 15 March 1819, documented the importance of the Newfoundland market
by suggesting that “Newfoundland is entirely supplied by this Island with live cattle,
1 The genesis of Prince Edward Island’s focus on Newfoundland in its reconstruction plans can be
found in a 1945 brief by the province’s Federation of Agriculture, which states in part: “The
development of export markets is vital to this province in which an exportable surplus of practically
every farm product is available. In this connection the development of Newfoundland trade is
particularly important”. See Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture Brief to Members of the
Prince Edward Island Legislature, 12 April 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 1b, J. Walter
Jones Papers (Jones Papers), Prince Edward Island Public Archives and Records Office (PEIPARO).
The Federation of Agriculture’s concerns were addressed in Prince Edward Island’s official plan for
post-war reconstruction, Interim Report of the PEI Advisory Reconstruction Committee
(Charlottetown, 1945) as well as at the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, 1945.
See Dominion and Provincial Submissions and Plenary Conference Discussions (Ottawa, 1946).
2 See the work of Ernest Forbes, especially E.R. Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927:
A Study in Canadian Regionalism (Montreal and Kingston, 1979); E.R. Forbes, “Consolidating
Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrialization of Canada during the Second World War”,
Acadiensis, XV, 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 3-27; and E.R. Forbes, “Cutting the Pie into Smaller Pieces:
Matching Grants and Relief in the Maritime Provinces in the 1930s”, Acadiensis, XXVI, 1 (Autumn
1987), pp. 34-55.
3 Newfoundland was the primary market for PEI-built vessels. Between 1800 and 1810, for example,
Newfoundland buyers purchased half of the 60 ships built on Prince Edward Island. See Nicolas J. De
Jong and Marvin E. Moore, Shipbuilding on Prince Edward Island: Enterprise in a Maritime Setting,
1787-1920 (Hull, QC, 1994), p. 24. Although their focus is on the shipbuilding industry, De Jong and
Moore also provide information on trade between PEI and Newfoundland.
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fowls, corn, potatoes, and even garden stuff”.4 Keith Matthews has concluded that, by
the early-19th century, Newfoundland “provided one of the largest markets for Prince
Edward Island ships and foodstuffs . . . and many merchants established businesses in
both markets”.5
Inter-island trade continued into the 20th century. In 1904 Ottawa recognized the
importance of this trade by granting a one-year subsidy to support Island shippers in
their efforts to consolidate their access to the Newfoundland market. A year later, the
federal government began to subsidize a route from Charlottetown to Placentia, with
stops at a number of Nova Scotia ports along the way. Despite the withdrawal of
federal support following the First World War, ships laden with foodstuffs destined
for Newfoundland remained a common sight in Prince Edward Island ports.6
Politician J. Angus McLean recalled, late in life, that in his youth “occasionally, a
farmer would haul a horse-drawn load of potatoes to the wharf in Montague or Murray
River, where a schooner would be loading for Newfoundland”.7 Although the
construction of railroads and the development of the coal and steel industry in Cape
Breton made North Sydney, Nova Scotia, the focus for regular ferry service to
Newfoundland, direct trade between Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland
continued as long as vessels were available to ply the Cabot Strait.
The Second World War created an unprecedented demand for ships, large and
small, thus threatening the availability of shipping capacity for the Newfoundland
trade. At the same time, demand for foodstuffs in Newfoundland and Labrador
reached unprecedented heights. Not only did the presence of a significant number of
both Canadian and American service personnel put stress on the colony’s food
supplies, but the money spent by the military establishment also increased the
capacity of Newfoundlanders to purchase imported foodstuffs.8 Although Prince
Edward Island farmers shipped a wide range of agricultural goods across the Cabot
4 Prince Edward Island Gazette, 15 March 1819, cited in De Jong and Moore, Shipbuilding on Prince
Edward Island, p. 29 (emphasis in De Jong and Moore).
5 Keith Matthews, Lectures on the History of Newfoundland (St. John’s, 1988), p. 45. Despite
Matthew’s recognition of inter-island trade, the subject has been virtually ignored by regional
scholars. Edward MacDonald’s excellent history of Prince Edward Island, If You’re Stronghearted:
Prince Edward Island in the Twentieth Century (Charlottetown, 2000), makes little mention of trade
between Charlottetown and St. John’s, an omission also found in Ernest Forbes and D.A. Muise eds.,
The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto and Fredericton, 1993) as well as Margaret R.
Conrad and James K. Hiller, Atlantic Canada: A Concise History (Don Mills, 2006). Although
Malcolm MacLeod has examined Newfoundland’s pre-Confederation links with Canada, and the
connections between the two islands occasionally appear in his work, they are never the primary
focus. See, for example, Malcolm MacLeod, “Subsidized Steamers to a Foreign Country: Canada and
Newfoundland, 1892-1949”, Acadiensis XIV, 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 66-92; Malcolm MacLeod,
“Students Abroad: Preconfederation Educational Links Between Newfoundland and the Mainland of
Canada”, Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers/Communications historiques (1985),
pp. 172-92; and Malcolm MacLeod, “Edging into North America: Lives and Foreign Linkages in Pre-
Confederation Newfoundland”, Acadiensis XXI, 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 146-61.
6 Information on subsidized shipping between Charlottetown and St. John’s can be gleaned from
Malcolm MacLeod, “Subsidized Steamers”, p. 79.
7 Angus MacLean, Making it home: memoirs of J. Angus MacLean (Charlottetown, 1998), pp. 20-1.
8 For an overview of Newfoundland’s wartime development see Conrad and Hiller, pp. 181-3. For a
more detailed examination see Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949
(Montreal and Kingston, 1988), esp. pp. 109-213.
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Strait to meet this new-found demand, the live beef-cattle trade experienced particular
difficulties.
It was fortunate for Island cattle farmers that Walter Jones was their premier when
wartime pressures threatened their trade with Newfoundland. A well-educated farmer,
with experience in exporting cattle to Newfoundland, Jones was a shrewd and
purposeful politician. After receiving his Bachelor of Arts from Acadia University in
1904, he briefly taught on the Island before furthering his education at the Ontario
Agricultural College from which he matriculated in 1909. He then moved to the United
States, where he taught at Virginia’s Hampton Agricultural Institute, leaving that
position to become assistant superintendent of the American government's
experimental farm in Arlington, Virginia. In 1913 Jones returned to Prince Edward
Island eager to apply his formal scientific training to farming. He experimented with
cattle breeding, and was so successful that one of his Holsteins, the Abegweit Milady,
set world records for milk and butterfat production. In May 1935 he was awarded the
King’s Silver Jubilee Medal for his contributions to agriculture. That same year, he was
elected to the Prince Edward Island legislature although he was, for a time, relegated
to the backbenches by a Liberal Party wary of his flirtation with the Progressives in the
1921 federal election. It was not until he became premier in 1943 that Jones formally
became part of the Liberal establishment.9 Casting himself as the “Farmer Premier”, he
soon earned the respect of many people on the agriculture-dependent Island.
As the Farmer Premier, Jones was well aware of the changes taking place in
agricultural production and marketing. The decades preceding the war saw the rapid
rise and modernization of the seed potato industry on PEI, changes that necessitated
larger and more modern methods of transportation to get the increased Island output
to distant markets. As a result, reliance on the traditional method of exporting Island
goods, a coasting schooner sailing from various outport communities, gradually
declined.10 In contrast to the traditional coastal trade, modern shipping was
concentrated at a central location where bulk carriers could be accommodated at
wharves specially designed for them. While Jones did not lobby for a modern carrier
– indeed, his preferred ship for the Newfoundland trade was nearly 60 years old – his
desire for a steamer dedicated to plying the waters between Charlottetown and St.
John’s shows that he endeavoured to adapt the Island cattle industry to the
modernizing framework suggested by earlier alterations in the seed potato industry.
The shipping pressures that arose during the Second World War only served to
strengthen the need, both real and perceived, for a subsidized steamer sailing to
Newfoundland from a centralized location.
In wartime conditions PEI-Newfoundland trade faced a number of challenges.
Demands on shipping curtailed PEI’s ability to transport goods across the Cabot Strait
while the issuing of essentiality certificates – or import permits – in large numbers to
companies not firmly entrenched in the Newfoundland market further eroded PEI’s
9 Wayne E. MacKinnon, The Life of the Party: A History of the Liberal Party in Prince Edward Island
(Summerside, 1973), pp. 109-10. For more on Jones see Wayne E. MacKinnon, “The Farmer Premier:
J. Walter Jones and His Vision of Prince Edward Island”, The Island Magazine, 35 (Spring-Summer
1994), pp. 3-9 and Edward MacDonald, If You’re Stronghearted, p. 218.
10 For more on the modernization of the seed potato industry in Prince Edward Island see Edward
MacDonald, If You’re Stronghearted, pp. 132-8.
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competitive position. Central Canadian-based firms such as Canada Packers began to
strengthen their hold on the Newfoundland beef-cattle market, a development
summarized by a PEI Federation of Agriculture brief submitted to the Island
legislature in 1945: “Under wartime conditions there had developed a competition in
Newfoundland from larger concerns in other provinces that bids fair to supplant our
own Provincial interests in this market”.11 Early in 1944, in an effort to protect a
lucrative market, Jones appointed William Agnew to serve as the Island’s trade
representative in Newfoundland.12 In his first dispatch home, Agnew described the
limited capacity available for shipping cattle on the North Sydney-to-Port aux
Basques ferry, which produced a major bottleneck at a time when the Newfoundland
cattle market was expanding dramatically.13 Between 1 and 25 May 1944, Agnew
claimed, about 600 head of cattle had been shipped across the Cabot Straight, “more
than in three months last year around this time”.14
This increase in cattle shipments was the outcome of a trade agreement reached in
March 1943 at a meeting in Washington in which Newfoundland promised to exchange
“as large quantities as possible” of dried fish in return for “a very long list” of much-
needed foodstuffs.15 Among other things, Canada agreed to supply Newfoundland with
3,840 head of live cattle annually, a 20 per cent increase over the pre-war estimates.16
Although this agreement went a long way towards fulfilling Newfoundland’s demands,
the Newfoundland government also had control over what could be imported. Under
the terms of this agreement, Newfoundland was required to furnish the Export Permit
Branch of Canada’s Department of Trade and Commerce with a “certificate of
11 Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture Brief to Members of the Prince Edward Island
Legislature, 12 April 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 1b, Jones Papers, PEIPARO. A 1944
letter from F.S. Grisdale to J. Ralph Kirk confirms this development. As Grisdale informed Kirk:
“The tendency during the last few months has been for the Newfoundland Government to give their
orders for live cattle to the large packing companies who purchase and ship cattle from the provinces
of Quebec and Ontario rather than from the Maritimes”. See F.S. Grisdale to J. Ralph Kirk, 16 June
1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 10, Jones Papers, PEIPARO. As PEI trade representative to
Newfoundland William Agnew observed from St. John’s, “Canada Packers Ltd. and Swifts [another
central Canadian meat-packing firm] have got things pretty well their own way as far as the cattle
trade is concerned”. See W.E. Agnew to J. Walter Jones, 7 June 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3,
file 25, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
12 William Agnew came from a prominent PEI family. He was the son of former Island Liberal MLA
and businessman John Agnew. It is uncertain exactly when Jones appointed Agnew; the earliest
reference to Agnew’s mission to Newfoundland is found in a letter from Agnew to Jones dated 25
May 1944 from North Sydney, Nova Scotia, while he was on route to Newfoundland. See W.E.
Agnew to J. Walter Jones, 25 May 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 25, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO as well as J. Walter Jones to Whom it May Concern, 22 January 1945, RG 25, series 33,
subseries 1, file 1A, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
13 W.E. Agnew to J. Walter Jones, 25 May 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 25, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO. For the presence of Walter Jones’s cattle in Newfoundland see Hilda Chaulk Murray,
Cows Don’t Know its Sunday: Agricultural Life in St. John’s (St. John’s, 2002), p. 244.
14 W.E. Agnew to J. Walter Jones, 25 May 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 25, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
15 James G. Gardiner to John A. McDonald, 5 January 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 8, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
16 In addition, Canada would supply Newfoundland with two million pounds of dressed beef. See James
G. Gardiner to John A. McDonald, 5 January 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 8, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
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essentiality” for all rationed goods to be exported to the island. By withholding these
certificates, the Newfoundland government could potentially bar products from entry.17
Soon after the agreement was reached Canadian cattle shipments to Newfoundland
increased, but the sudden influx of cattle presented its own difficulties. By September
1943, after only 1,499 head of cattle had crossed the Cabot Straight, a Newfoundland
delegation led by Sir J.C. Puddester, who was in charge of the colony’s food and price
controls, travelled to Ottawa to renegotiate the agreement. At a series of meetings
attended by representatives of the United States, Canada and Newfoundland,
Puddester detailed the unexpected problems with the system that had emerged over
the summer.18 Apparently, it had proven difficult for Newfoundland authorities to
control the distribution of live beef, most of which was being shipped to the Avalon
Peninsula. Once there, live cattle changed hands numerous times and were often
privately slaughtered, with the predictable outcome that the meat did not enter the
regular distribution channels to be sold to the general public. The freshly slaughtered
Canadian meat that managed to enter the ordinary food supply also caused problems.
Newfoundland had no price ceiling on fresh beef, and, as a result, it could sell for a
significant sum. This gave the dealers “an extortionate profit on the imported product
to the disadvantage of the consumer”.19 Moreover, Newfoundland was ill-prepared for
the sudden influx of vast numbers of live cattle. Since cattle feed was in short supply,
imported animals had to be slaughtered soon after arrival. Finally, Puddester
suggested that bringing live animals to Newfoundland was wasteful shipping, as the
space required to move 8,000 pounds of cattle could transport 30,000 pounds of
dressed meat. In light of these concerns, the Newfoundland statesman asked that the
export of live Canadian cattle to Newfoundland be discontinued and that the quota on
dressed beef be increased on the basis of 500 pounds of dressed beef for each head of
cattle mandated by the 1943 agreement. In an example of hardball negotiating, the
Newfoundland government began to withhold the necessary essentiality certificates
17 The essentiality certificate system is spelled out in K.L. Melvin to J.B. Lander, 25 August 1943, RG
64, vol. 915, file 1-26-6 (Supplies for NFLD), Library and Archives Canada (LAC).
18 In addition to Puddester, Newfoundland was represented by the following officials: Ray Manning,
secretary to the Department of Public Works; W.E. Curtis, Newfoundland government supplies
officer; H.R. Brookes, a member of the Priorities Committee and chairman of the Wholesale
Provision section of the Newfoundland Board of Trade; R.G. Winter, a member of the Newfoundland
Transportation Board; F.E. Hue, Newfoundland supply liaison to Washington; and advisors F. Blair
and C.C. Polkinghorne. The Canadian delegation included the following officials: R.A. Mackay and
H.F. Feaver of the Department of External Affairs; R.E. Robinson of the Department of Munitions
and Supply; R. Geddes and M.B. Palmer of the Supply Division of the Wartime Prices and Trade
Board; C.M. Croft, director of the Commercial Intelligence Service of the Department of Trade and
Commerce; Dr. George Britnell, E.J. Jordan and G.R. Hawkins of the Foods Administration Division
of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, Dr. H. Derby, F.W. Presant and L.W. Pearsell of the
Department of Agriculture; and J.H. English, G.D. Mallory, T. Grant Major and V.E. Duclos of the
Department of Trade and Commerce. Also in attendance was Canadian Government Trade
Commissioner to Newfoundland R.J. Bower. The United States sent two representatives: F.J. Cogan
and Ray Milans of Washington’s Office of Economic Warfare. See R.P. Bower to C.J. Burchell, 28
October 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
19 Copy of letter from James Gardiner to John A. McDonald, 5 January 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries
2, file 8, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
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for live cattle on the grounds that, while the colony was granted a quota of 3,280 live
cattle, it was under no obligation to accept them.20
Troubled by the proposal of the Newfoundland delegates, Jones wrote to Canadian
High Commissioner to Newfoundland, C.J. Burchell, to get his insight into the matter.
Burchell replied that the proposal to ban live cattle imports had been generated by
Newfoundland’s Commission of Government and that many Newfoundlanders were
themselves against it.21 This appears to be the case. In October 1943, George Neal, a
St John’s-based meat seller, wrote to Deputy Food Controller E.C. Price in the
Commission of Government to express his dismay at the proposed ban. Neal had been
selling Canadian livestock for over 25 years and was of the opinion that “the public
requires fresh beef and are not anxious for frozen or chilled beef when they can get
that which is freshly killed”. Neal implored Price to check with the butchers of St.
John’s. He was confident that they, too, would be against a ban on live Canadian cattle
that favoured dressed beef, as there would not be much meat-cutting work for beef
that had already been processed.22
The prospect of a ban on live-cattle imports to Newfoundland and the threat of a
hardline stance on essentiality certificates by the Newfoundland government occasioned
a maelstrom of protest in the Maritimes. The region’s cattle exporters, particularly those
in PEI and eastern Nova Scotia, believed that reworking the agreement would curtail a
long-standing export business. This news prompted Jones to again write Burchell,
informing the high commissioner of his intention to go to Newfoundland to see if he
could do anything to remedy the matter, for if the ban stayed in place it would be
“extremely harmful to the interests of Prince Edward Island”.23 Burchell informed
Ottawa of the premier’s intentions and Jones’s concerns were answered by Department
of National Defence Staff Secretary James E. Wells, an Islander who had served as an
advisor to Jones’s predecessor Thane Campbell. No doubt Jones was disappointed with
Wells’s reply, in which he stated that “I do not see what we can do from here.” Yet
Wells encouraged Jones to take up the matter with officials in St. John’s, since “on the
whole . . . [your] original idea of going to Newfoundland yourself would be more apt to
produce satisfactory results than anything else”.24
Before going to Newfoundland, Jones was contacted on 3 November 1943 by
Baron & Lewis Co., a firm of St. John’s lawyers who represented more than 100 of
that city’s butchers. Together, Jones and the barristers conspired to stage a
demonstration in St. John’s, believing that “a strong protest from the residents of
Newfoundland to the Prime Minister of Canada” might elicit support from no less a
figure than William Lyon Mackenzie King. The protest failed to materialize when, on
20 See, for example, L.W. Pearsell to F.W. Walsh, 2 October 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file
24, Jones Papers, PEIPARO, which mentions that Eastern Co-operative Services Ltd was denied an
essentiality certificate for shipping live cattle to Newfoundland.
21 For the mood in Newfoundland see the editorial in the St. John’s Evening Telegram, 28 October 1943,
p. 6.
22 Copy of letter from George Neal to E.C. Price, 22 October 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file
24, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
23 J. Walter Jones to C.J. Burchell, 27 October 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
24 James E. Wells to J. Walter Jones, 3 November 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
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13 November, Baron & Lewis was able to gain an audience with the Newfoundland
commissioner for public health and welfare. While the commissioner would not agree
to halt the ban on the importation of live cattle, the protest was called off when the
commissioner agreed that he would review the situation by the coming spring.25
Jones was of the opinion that the problems would be resolved before the
commissioner’s review because, even with a larger quota of dressed beef, demand
would outstrip supply.26 “I expect”, Jones wrote, “they will have to order animals on
the hoof, if they want to eat beef”.27 But the situation was more complicated than
Jones had anticipated. One of Newfoundland’s primary objections to the importation
of live cattle was that there was not enough feed to support the imported beef cattle
along with the colony’s dairy herds. The supply of cattle feed grew so precarious in
the fall of 1943 that Puddester met with United States officials in an effort to resolve
the problem. Although he was successful in securing feed from the United States for
some Newfoundland dairy farmers, this came too late as they had already begun to
thin their herds. As R.P. Bower, the Canadian government’s trade commissioner to
Newfoundland, explained in a letter to C.J. Burchell: “This automatically removes
one of the principle [sic] objections to the importation of livestock for local
slaughter”.28 In light of the thinning of the island’s herds and Puddester’s successful
trip to the United States, there no longer remained any need to curtail shipments of
Canadian cattle to Newfoundland on account of an insufficient feed supply and the
trade was allowed to resume subject to the terms of the original agreement.
Still, the demand for beef in wartime Newfoundland outpaced supply and, in return
for Newfoundland accepting the full quota of live cattle, Canada agreed to increase
the export quota for carcass beef by 600,000 pounds.29 The immediate beneficiaries of
the new agreement were cattle farmers in Prince Edward Island. In November 1943
the only permits being issued by the federal government for live cattle export to
Newfoundland went to Islanders. Officials in Ottawa, many of them schooled in the
politics of the Maritime Rights movement of the 1920s, understood the resentment of
“Upper Canadian” dominance that prevailed in the Maritime Provinces. Recognizing
that “the continuance of this trade is a matter of some importance to both Prince
Edward Island and Newfoundland”, they were reluctant to disrupt a longstanding
trading relationship.30 There were also practical reasons for giving Maritime
25 P.J. Lewis to J. Walter Jones, 13 November 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
26 J. Walter Jones to Baron & Lewis, 25 November 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
27 J. Walter Jones to C.J. Burchell, 22 November 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
28 R.P. Bower to C.J. Burchell, 27 November 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
29 Copy of letter from James Gardiner to John A. McDonald, 5 January 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries
2, file 8, Jones Papers, PEIPARO; R.P. Bower to C.J. Burchell, 27 November 1943, RG 25, series 33,
subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers, PEIPARO. “Carcass beef” is the same as “dressed beef”.
30 K.W. Taylor, co-ordinator, Foods Administration, to D. Gordon, 13 November 1943, RG 64, vol.
1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 1, LAC. This seems to have been a temporary measure, as within a year cattle
from across the Maritimes could be shipped to Newfoundland, although the majority still came from
PEI. See W.R. Ingram, “Re: Newfoundland Live Cattle”, 24 October 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-
1-5-1, vol. 3, LAC.
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producers preference in the Newfoundland trade. As an August 1943 letter from W.R.
Ingram, special assistant in Ottawa’s Food Administration Branch of the Wartime
Prices and Trade Board, to A.G. Hall of Canada Packers stated: “It just so happens
that geographically, Prince Edward Island is possibly better located than any other
point to make the shipments of live cattle to Newfoundland”.31
Limiting the ability of central Canadian firms such as Dunn & Lavasir, Swifts and
Canada Packers to sell live cattle to Newfoundland underscored the problems faced
by Maritime cattle producers in competing in an open market. The region’s
difficulties were not lost on bureaucrats in Ottawa. In June 1944, F.S. Grisdale, a
functionary with the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, cautioned Nova Scotia MP J.
Ralph Kirk on the need to regulate cattle shipments to Newfoundland, because
“without close attention to this phase of cattle exports there would be a definite trend
to the transferring of the export business from the small operators to the larger
operators that would export from the interior of Canada rather than from the Maritime
Provinces”.32
Despite sustained protests, most notably from Canada Packers, the federal
government proved quite firm in its commitment to giving Maritime producers
preferred status for cattle shipments to the Newfoundland market. On 27 June 1944,
A.G. Hall again wrote to Ingram, complaining that he had more cattle than the Ontario
market could adequately handle, and suggesting that he be allowed to ship them to St.
John’s and Corner Brook. In his response, Ingram emphasized that “we cannot meet
your views or change our position in connection with filling these order[s] except
from the Maritimes”.33 Hall stubbornly refused to acknowledge that the Maritimes
should have the exclusive claim on the Newfoundland market, stating that he could
not “see any very good business reason why we should be refused permission to ship
these Cattle from Toronto”.34 But Ingram left no room for misinterpretation: “There
is a definite reason for the decision to allow Cattle to move only from the Maritimes,
principally P.E.I. to Newfoundland. . . . Newfoundland has been a natural outlet for
their surplus cattle for many years”.35 Ingram suggested that Canada Packers purchase
its cattle from Maritime beef farmers and then ship to Newfoundland from within the
region. As the Ottawa mandarin made clear to the meat packer, “so long as these cattle
are being moved from the Maritimes”, Canada Packers would have no problems
gaining the required export permits from the federal government.36
Canada Packers followed Ingram’s advice and began to purchase PEI cattle to sell
in Newfoundland. It did so, it seems, not to assist PEI-Newfoundland trade relations
but to undermine them. According to Walter Jones, Canada Packers purchased poor-
quality PEI beef cattle in an effort to “sabotage” the Island’s burgeoning beef trade
with Newfoundland. Canada Packers, Jones contended, was “using their agents to buy
up the meanest kind of stuff that can be purchased and are shipping them to
31 W.R. Ingram to A.G. Hall, 13 August 1943, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 1, LAC.
32 F.S. Grisdale to J. Ralph Kirk, 9 June 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 1, LAC.
33 See A.G. Hall to W.R. Ingram, 27 June 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 1, LAC as well as
W.R. Ingram to A.G. Hall, 28 June 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 1, LAC.
34 A.G. Hall to W.R. Ingram, 29 June 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 1, LAC.
35 W.R. Ingram to A.G. Hall, 30 June 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 1, LAC.
36 W.R. Ingram to A.G. Hall, 15 August 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 3, LAC.
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Newfoundland”.37 This had a profound impact on the calibre of Island cattle being
exported. As the PEI Federation of Agriculture reported: “Live cattle shipments [to
Newfoundland] have turned out . . . very disappointing and yields of about 40 per cent
of an inferior quality have been reported”.38 Jones contended that this approach would
lead Newfoundlanders to equate Island cattle with second-rate products, and that they
would then demand that their government allow the cattle trade to once again become
deregulated. The fact that Canada Packers obtained one-third of the 1944 essentiality
permits made this scheme especially dangerous, and caused Walter Jones a great deal
of concern.39
While the government could mandate that only dressed beef of a certain grade could
be exported, live cattle were quite different, as there was no such quality control system
in place.40 Grisdale advised Jones that quality requirements for PEI export cattle could
be developed, but that these rules would have to be applied across the board to all
exporters. “I can see where there would be great difficulties”, Grisdale told the premier,
“. . . particularly if the standard of export quality of cattle was high and the Government
inspectors culled out a large percentage of the purchases made by Canada Packers”.41
Although it is difficult to determine if, as Jones contended, Canada Packers actually
tried to discredit the PEI cattle industry by shipping substandard Island cattle to
Newfoundland – an approach that would seemingly hurt Canada Packers as much as
Island cattle farmers – the fact that Jones believed they would try so devious a ploy is
indicative of the tensions that existed between Maritime farmers and central Canadian
industry, and it may partially account for the arbitrary manner in which Jones dealt
with the 1947 strike at the Canada Packers’ Charlottetown plant.42
As long as wartime regulations prevailed, the federal government remained
committed to Maritime-based suppliers for the Newfoundland market. However,
Prince Edward Island’s preferential status with respect to beef exports to
Newfoundland meant little without a reliable means of getting the product across the
Cabot Strait. In 1942, the federal government initiated a one-year subsidy for a
steamer to travel from Charlottetown to St. John’s every three weeks; however, the
vessel was often inadequate to the needs of Island cattle exporters because cattle took
second place to other wartime supplies. As a result, Island cattle producers were
37 J. Walter Jones to F.S. Grisdale, 1 September 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 10, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
38 Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture Brief to Members of the Prince Edward Island
Legislature, 12 April 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 1b, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
39 J. Walter Jones to F.S. Grisdale, 31 August 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 2, LAC. See
also J. Walter Jones to F.S. Grisdale, 1 September 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 10, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO, where Jones asks Grisdale to try to limit the number of essentiality certificates
being granted to Canada Packers.
40 The institution of a quality control system was something that the Prince Edward Island Federation of
Agriculture called for: “We would suggest to the Government, the need of having live cattle,
consigned to Newfoundland, carefully inspected and graded before shipment from this Province, thus
giving the purchaser making orders here, some definite knowledge of what he is buying”. See Prince
Edward Island Federation of Agriculture Brief to Members of the Prince Edward Island Legislature,
12 April 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 1b, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
41 F.S. Grisdale to J. Walter Jones, 2 September 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045, file 6-1-5-1, vol. 2, LAC.
42 For more on the 1947 strike at the Charlottetown Canada Packers plant see Edward MacDonald, If
You’re Stronghearted, p. 234.
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increasingly obliged to rely on the North Sydney-Port aux Basques ferry that made
three trips weekly. Since most goods shipped from the Canadian mainland to
Newfoundland also took this ferry, and the ferry was on a first come-first serve basis,
delays inevitably developed that took a toll on live cattle and dressed beef alike. The
October 1942 sinking of the ferry Caribou, one of the few ships capable of shipping
cattle across the strait, only served to amplify crossing delays.43 The obvious solution,
as the Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture made clear, was for the
provincial government to institute “a special Prince Edward Island-Newfoundland
service under such controls as will insure every shipper, farmer, dealer or cooperative,
an opportunity of utilizing the space so provided”.44
The desirability of a direct Charlottetown-St. John’s route was underscored by the
actions of the Newfoundland government-operated Newfoundland Railway, which
routinely applied an embargo on imported live cattle intended for slaughter in the
butcheries of St. John’s upon their arrival in Port aux Basques. Notoriously difficult
to handle as cargo, live cattle were often the first to be embargoed when space became
a consideration on trains running from Port aux Basques to the Newfoundland capital.
A widespread embargo had the potential to substantially delay the shipment of live
cattle from the docks of North Sydney to St. John’s. For J. Ralph Kirk the solution
was as obvious as it was problematic: “Those who are in a position to ship by an all-
water route . . . will of course be fine, but the scarcity of vessels or steamers since the
war began is a serious handicap”.45
Another impediment to Prince Edward Island-Newfoundland shipping was the
threat posed by German U-boats that penetrated the Gulf of the St. Lawrence and
wreaked havoc, sinking 21 vessels in addition to the ferry Caribou.46 Even with the
added lure of a government subsidy, private companies were reluctant to ply the route.
C.D. Howe, Canada’s minister of reconstruction, noted in 1944 that “it has been
practically impossible to secure boats to carry livestock and hay – two of the
commodities we desire most to ship”.47
The few ships that braved the perilous waters between Prince Edward Island and
Newfoundland often proved insufficient to the task. In early July 1944, the Meigle, a
diesel schooner that had seen nearly 60 years of service, left Charlottetown for
Newfoundland with a full hold, yet it still left a great deal of freight on Island
wharves. This was because the Meigle was already “filled nearly half full” with
gasoline, munitions and other wartime necessities, having been conscripted into
carrying war-related goods to Newfoundland for the federal government. The problem
43 For a study of the sinking of the Caribou see Malcolm MacLeod, “Death by Choice or by Chance: U-
69 and the First Newfoundland Ferry Caribou”, Newfoundland Studies, 12, 1 (Spring/Fall 1996), pp.
1-15.
44 Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture Brief to Members of the Prince Edward Island
Legislature, 12 April 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 1b, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
45 J. Ralph Kirk to Dr. G.S.H Barton, deputy minister of agriculture, 24 May 1944, RG 64, vol. 1045,
file 6-1-5-1 vol. 1, LAC. For more on the Newfoundland Railway’s cattle embargo, see also James
Gardiner to John A. McDonald, 5 January 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 8, PEIPARO.
46 Among the victims of the Caribou sinking were three cars of cattle destined for the Newfoundland
market. See Malcolm MacLeod, “Death by Choice or by Chance: U-69 and the First Newfoundland
Ferry Caribou”, p. 11.
47 Speech by C.D. Howe, 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 40, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
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of shipping capacity became so acute in 1943 that the provincial government hired a
smaller vessel, the Moyle River, to make up for the limited space available on the
Meigle.48
As a result of these various impediments to reliable shipping between the two
islands, Prince Edward Island products were often in short supply in Newfoundland.
From his vantage point in Newfoundland, Agnew observed in May 1944 that “people
here like our produce and will take larger supplies than they are now taking if and
when we get better transport for our goods”.49 Premier Jones mused in December
1943 that the province needed to secure its own “schooners to convey them [cattle] to
several points in Newfoundland”.50 When it became known that the government of
Prince Edward Island was interested in purchasing a vessel of its own, a number of
shipping companies wrote the premier in efforts to sell off portions of their fleet.51
Jones politely acknowledged the various offers, but there is no evidence to suggest
that he considered any of them to be a serious answer to the province’s shipping woes.
One solution to the Prince Edward Island-Newfoundland shipping problem that
received strong consideration was for the provincial government to acquire the
Meigle, which was owned and operated by the Halifax-based Shaw Steamship
Company.52 In an 18 July 1944 letter to James E. Wells, Jones mentioned the
possibility of Prince Edward Island purchasing the Meigle should a “large subsidy” of
$50,000 per annum be available. A subsidy of this amount, Jones believed, could
allow Prince Edward Island to purchase the ship and effectively travel the route. The
only problem with this solution was that the province, as owner of the Meigle, would
be responsible for the ship’s taxes.53
C.B. Christian of Shaw Steamship Co. tried to address Jones’s taxation concerns
48 In 1943 the Moyle River made nine trips from Charlottetown to Newfoundland. See Oliver Master to
J. Walter Jones, 10 March 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 32, Jones Papers, PEIPARO. See
also Malcolm MacLeod, “Subsidized Steamers”, p. 79.
49 W.E. Agnew to J. Walter Jones, 27 May 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 25, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
50 J. Walter Jones to P.J. Lewis, 16 December 1943, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
51 In February 1944, Cape Breton’s Hygeia Steamship Company Limited offered Jones their C.A.
Roland, a 94-foot vessel of 102 gross tons for an outright cash purchase price of $50,000 or at a lease
rate of $6,000 per month. In September of that same year Marine Industries Limited of Sorel, Quebec,
approached Prince Edward Island with a vessel “140’ long, 30’ beam and 11’ deep” that could
purportedly carry 600 tons of freight below decks. And in January 1945, Captain Lester Beck of
Summerside proffered the services of his 104-foot freighter to the premier, although Beck was under
the impression that the route only went as far as St. Pierre. See David G. Burchell to J. Walter Jones,
25 February 1944 and David G. Burchell to J. Walter Jones, 25 March 1944, RG 25, series 33,
subseries 1, file 4:B, Jones Papers, PEIPARO; C.H. Boily to J. Walter Jones, 7 September 1944, RG
25, series 33, subseries 1, file 16: M, Jones Papers, PEIPARO; and Lester Beck to J. Walter Jones, 3
January 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 4: B, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
52 Jones also apparently gave strong consideration to the Patdoris, a Scottish-built steam collier
featuring two holds of 500 tonnes each. The British Admiralty had an option on the Patdoris, and with
the war in its denouement “the United Kingdom Government has been buying up all suitable small
boats they can get”. See J.L. Ralston to J. Walter Jones, 26 May 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2,
file 29, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
53 J. Walter Jones to James E. Wells, 18 July 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 31, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
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by proposing that the province lease the vessel for a five-year period at $50,000 per
year. For this fee, the steamer would operate from April to December making two trips
a month from Charlottetown to St. John’s and, Christian added, “if necessary, . . .
during certain periods of the season, the steamer might make three trips during the
month from Charlottetown to St. John’s direct”.54 Christian argued that the
“acquisition” of the Meigle would also help alleviate the delays at the Borden ferry
terminal occasioned by shipments routed to Newfoundland through North Sydney and
Halifax. When Jones balked at the offer, Christian agreed to pay five per cent of the
$50,000 out of his own pocket. Even with Christian’s concession, Jones found the
$50,000 per year price tag too much for a vessel that the government would not own,
and he passed on the deal.55
In absence of a dedicated steamer to serve the Prince Edward Island-
Newfoundland route, Jones approached Canadian National Railways to assist him in
securing a temporary solution for Prince Edward Island exports. The reply likely gave
Jones much reason for optimism. The CNR’s industrial representative in the Atlantic
region, Arthur Day, informed the premier that a Newfoundland Railway boat,
chartered from the Montreal Shipping Company, made regular trips from Montreal
and was usually about 1000 tons light. This necessitated a stop in North Sydney to
take on freight. As Day told Jones: “If there was cargo available in Charlottetown, it
could be arranged for this boat to make your Capital a port of call”.56 Day further
assisted Jones by contacting J.C. Britton, the Canadian government trade
commissioner in Newfoundland, about the Island’s desire to foster trade with
Newfoundland, and he secured Britton’s pledge to “co-operate with you in every way
to introduce the products of P.E.I. into this country”.57 Having a man on the ground in
Newfoundland also proved beneficial, as W.E. Agnew contacted E.E. Kirchner,
manager of the Montreal Shipping Company, and put him in touch with Jones.58 This
fortuitous confluence of events prompted the Prince Edward Island government to
enter into an arrangement with the Halifax office of the Montreal Shipping Company,
an arrangement apparently abetted by the Newfoundland government’s desire to
ensure that its chartered ship was full as early in its voyage as possible. On 12 August
1944, Jones wrote Christian to let him know unequivocally that any deal with the
Shaw Steamship Co. for the Meigle was off, as Prince Edward Island had entered into
an agreement with the Montreal Shipping Company for the remainder of the year.
54 C.B. Christian to Walter Jones, 21 July 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 6c, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
55 A letter from C.B. Christian to Walter Jones hints at this, as Christian informed Jones that he has “no
doubt there are many offers of ships, the trouble is to get something suitable for that particular trade”.
See C.B. Christian to Walter Jones, 27 July 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 6c, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
56 Arthur Day to J. Walter Jones, 31 July 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 6c: C, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
57 Arthur Day to J. Walter Jones, 11 August 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 6c: C, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
58 E.E. Kirchner indicates that it was Agnew’s suggestion to the Newfoundland Railway that Kirchner
contact Jones. See E.E. Kirchner to J. Walter Jones, 11 July 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file
24, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
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Jones argued that “there was this angle to it, that it was difficult to get the necessary
permits if we did not play ball with the Newfoundland Government”.59 In other words,
in return for ensuring that the Newfoundland Railway boat was full, the
Newfoundland government would ensure that the Prince Edward Island producers had
the necessary essentiality certificates for their exports. Given the challenges facing
producers exporting livestock to Newfoundland the previous year, this sort of
informal quid pro quo agreement no doubt had a certain appeal.
The services of the Montreal Shipping Company failed to live up to expectations.
It made a bad first impression, for instance, by overcharging the Prince Edward Island
government. Instead of living up to its agreement that the cost of shipping from
Charlottetown to St. John’s would be the same 70 cents-per-one hundred pounds rate
as was charged on shipments from Halifax to the Newfoundland capital, Islanders
were charged 5 1/4 cents more, a discrepancy quickly acknowledged and remedied by
the shipping company.60 Of greater concern was the poor performance of the Montreal
Shipping Company’s Henry W. Stone. It was unable to carry even 300 tons of Island
potatoes and did not have a suitable deck load or on-deck storage area, something the
company had intimated that the ship possessed during discussions with the Island
government. As a result of its limited storage capacity, the ship had difficulty
accommodating live cattle.
So bad was the service being provided that farmers were reluctant to take their
products to the dockyards for fear that they would not get placed on the boat, and the
provincial government had to commission assistance from the Shaw Steamship Co. to
“clear up” the Henry W. Stone’s outstanding cargo, a development that displeased
Montreal Shipping Company manager E.E. Kirchner.61 In a 5 September 1944 cable
to Jones, a defensive Kirchner laid much of the blame for the shipping problems on
the Islanders. He claimed that the Island tradition of “Old Home Week” had disrupted
the H.W. Stone’s 15 August 1944 attempt to acquire a shipment, as farmers were
apparently too distracted by the festivities to produce a full cargo. When the H.W.
Stone returned a week later, considerable delays in loading it ensued and the vessel
failed to receive a full load. As for the complaints regarding the company’s failure to
ship cattle, Kirchner referred to the initial agreement, which stated ambiguously that
“a larger steamer will be provided when sufficient cattle and cargo is offering”.62 It
59 J. Walter Jones to C.B. Christian, 12 August 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 6c: C, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO. William Agnew had informed Jones of the desirability of appeasing Kirchner.
Writing to Jones with regards to a meeting with the executives of the Montreal Shipping Company,
Agnew stated that “these are the people that we really want to contact as they represent the
Newfoundland Government and we can get many concessions by dealing with them”. See W.E.
Agnew to J. Walter Jones, 10 July 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 25, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
60 See E.E. Kirchner to J. Walter Jones, 11 August 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO; J. Walter Jones to E.E. Kirchner, 2 October 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3,
file 24, Jones Papers, PEIPARO; and E.E. Kirchner to J. Walter Jones, 6 October 1944, RG 25, series
33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers, PEIPARO.
61 J. Walter Jones to E.E. Kirchner, 2 September 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
62 E.E. Kirchner to J. Walter Jones, 5 September 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
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was Kirchner’s contention that until this time such a vessel had not been needed, as
there simply had not been sufficient demand. In a passage that no doubt sat poorly
with Jones, Kirchner trumpeted that he had made arrangements “to ship cattle for the
time being through North Sydney and Port aux Basques and St. John’s by
Newfoundland steamer and Newfoundland Railway”. Kirchner concluded his letter
by advising Jones against making changes that might hinder the development of a
successful trade relationship between Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, such
as “allowing the occasional stray vessel needing cargo” to disrupt the regular inter-
island freight schedule. Kirchner’s condescending appeal failed to convince Jones,
who pointedly told the shipper that “the service [has been] most unsatisfactory and we
think that probably we shall receive little or no credit for inaugurating it and a good
deal of criticism for advising that the subsidy be applied in your case for the work that
you are doing”.63
Prompted by the Montreal Shipping Company’s disappointing service, and by the
fear that this poor service would provoke an electoral revolt, the Island government
again turned its attention to securing a dedicated ship for the trade. In February 1945,
Jones wrote to Oliver Master, assistant deputy minister of Trade and Commerce, to
state the case for an increased subsidy with which to assist this route, suggesting that
an appropriate amount would be between $50,000 and $100,000, up significantly
from the $17,500 provided at that time. To justify this hefty increase Jones compared
the subsidy granted the Charlottetown-St. John’s route to those being used to assist
other Maritime trade routes. The Pictou-Magdalen Islands ferry, which also called at
Souris, he noted, received $50,000 annually, “and she has not even carried freight
from Prince Edward Island in the past year”. A small steamer operating from
Montague, Prince Edward Island, to Sydney received $15,000. As Jones strenuously
argued, “the trade with Newfoundland was at least ten times as important as either of
these”.64 In recognition of the Newfoundland trade’s importance, Jones requested
$50,000 annually to assist a steamer in making the run from Charlottetown to St.
John’s as well as a smaller $10,000 subsidy for a diesel schooner to trade with
Newfoundland’s western outports. Jones was not the only Island politician lobbying
for assistance to this trade route; the plan was also endorsed by Prince Edward Island
MP J.L. Douglas, who had met with Minister of Trade and Commerce J.A.
MacKinnon about putting a 1,000 ton boat on fortnightly service between
Charlottetown and St. John’s with a $60,000 annual subsidy.65
Despite the active lobbying by the Island’s provincial and federal politicians for a
subsidy to purchase a vessel, Ottawa was content to maintain the status quo. H.W.
Mills, director of the Montreal Shipping Company, wrote F.E. Bawden, director of
trade routes and steamship subsidies for the Department of Trade and Commerce, to
inform him that he had convinced the Newfoundland Railway to replace the
unsatisfactory Henry W. Stone with the steamer John Cabot for the Prince Edward
63 J. Walter Jones to E.E. Kirchner, 18 October 1944, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 24, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
64 J. Walter Jones to Oliver Master, 26 February 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 32, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
65 See Oliver Master to J. Walter Jones, 10 March 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 32, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
16981-07 Slumkoski Article  9/12/06  11:04 AM  Page 120
The Prince Edward Island-Newfoundland Beef-Cattle Trade 121
Island-Newfoundland route. The John Cabot would make three trips every two
months for a subsidy of $4,500 per trip. One of the key shortcomings of this
agreement was that it made Prince Edward Island products the second option, since
the ship would be bunkered in Sydney. Although Mills stated that he would
“guarantee to leave sufficient space to take care of all cargo and cattle which the
Prince Edward Island authorities have available when the vessel leaves Sydney”,66
goods shipped through North Sydney would still be loaded on the vessel first. This
presented the very real possibility that there would be insufficient space on board for
Prince Edward Island products once the ship reached Charlottetown. As Jones
informed Bawden when told of the proposed plan in April 1945, “we have no
objections to this plan if the ship sails from Charlottetown and loads all the freight we
offer first and . . . in so far as cattle and other live-stock are concerned, we should have
priority for them as our rail-haul is too long and costly for such freight”.67 Since this
plan was basically what MP Douglas had lobbied for, Jones agreed to it and an order-
in-council was passed in Parliament authorising a $4,500 per trip subsidy to the route,
but not before Jones’s persistent lobbying had raised the ire of Prime Minister
Mackenzie King, who recorded in his diary that the PEI premier was “extreme in
everything”.68
With war’s end Canada began to adapt to a peacetime economy. A large part of this
adaptation revolved around the Canadian export trade. Its economic position
weakened by the recently completed conflict, Great Britain was unwilling to match its
pre-war commitments to Canadian imports. With the British capacity for Canadian
products diminished, Canada began to focus on the continental market and exports to
the United States rose significantly, especially in selected agricultural goods.69 With
the vast American market seemingly ripe for the picking, fostering PEI trade with
Newfoundland was low on Ottawa’s priority list, and PEI’s wartime problems of
securing adequate shipping capacity for the St. John’s route persisted. During the war
Ottawa had proven reluctant to invest in the Island – little would change during the
post-war era.70
Ottawa’s commitment to assist with transporting PEI goods on the John Cabot, for
instance, did little to solve the province’s shipping woes, and the vessel soon proved
as disappointing to Islanders as the Henry W. Stone had been. By November 1945,
Jones was writing Minister of Reconstruction C.D. Howe to voice his concerns with
the boat and its services. Jones’s first complaint was that the $4,500 subsidy per
voyage for the ship was simply too high, especially for a steamer of such limited use.
As Jones told Howe: “This is a most unsatisfactory ship and at the moment is fully
66 H.W. Mills to F.E. Bawden, 6 April 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 5, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
67 J. Walter Jones to F.E. Bawden, 11 April 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 1, file 5, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
68 William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary, 1 February 1945, MG 26, LAC.
69 Robert Bothwell, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto, 1979), pp. 229, 235.
70 During the war the Department of Munitions and Supply invested $1.6 billion for the expansion of
Canadian industry. Of this amount PEI received nothing. Support for the already established Island
shipbuilding industry was almost as meagre, with Ottawa only providing $400,000 to PEI
shipbuilders over the course of the conflict. See Ernest Forbes, “Consolidating Disparity”, p. 20.
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loaded with livestock and produce and is laid up for days for repairs before they can
sail”. And this was not merely an isolated incident; such delays had happened on
several occasions, with the result that Prince Edward Island livestock “arrives in very
poor condition”.71 For a province trying to make a favourable impression on
Newfoundland merchants in the face of competition from central Canadian suppliers,
this situation was untenable.
Jones urged C.D. Howe to allocate two soon-to-be decommissioned military
supply-ships to the trade. Jones had even picked out two that he felt would be
especially appropriate: the Mohawk and the Beaver. The larger of the two, the Beaver,
was a diesel schooner of 460 tons, which the Island premier believed would be well-
suited to make the trip between the two island capitals. The smaller Mohawk, a 150-
ton vessel, was better suited to the outport trade. Reluctant to set a precedent by
making a cash payment to the provincial government, Ottawa apparently suggested
that the province be given the Beaver and the Mohawk in partial or whole payment for
a claim against the Department of Defence for damage to Island roads.72 The deal
seems not to have been finalized as the Wartime Assets Board advertised the sale of
the Mohawk in the Halifax Herald shortly after Jones broached the matter to Howe.
Jones wrote the board about the matter, informing them of Prince Edward Island’s
ongoing interest in the vessel. “We are anxious to get her for the trade to
Newfoundland and the outports”, Jones said, “and think she will be very suitable”. To
this end, the Island government made an offer of $25,000, which amounted to about
a third of the ship’s value when it was launched. Jones further asked the board to give
him the right of first refusal on the vessel, stating that he hoped that they would
“communicate with us to see if we will be willing to give a few thousand dollars
higher, if it is necessary”.73 When P.A. Belanger of the Wartime Assets Board’s
Marine Section responded that “$25,000.00 is an extremely low price for such a
vessel”,74 Jones contacted one of his Island connections, Kingsborough, PEI-born
Deputy Minister for Air H.F. Gordon, and implored him to “use your good offices to
make it a deal for us”.75
It is uncertain how much sway the deputy minister held with the Wartime Assets
Board in the reallocation of wartime shipping to domestic service. It seems reasonable
to conclude that the board’s asking price remained more than Prince Edward Island
was willing to spend since the province ultimately did not purchase its own vessel for
inter-island trade. This is not to say that Jones came up empty-handed in his
petitioning of Ottawa. He was able to secure a four-year extension of the previous
year’s subsidy with the federal government’s commitment to support 12 trips between
71 J. Walter Jones to C.D. Howe, 12 November 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 11, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
72 J. Walter Jones to C.D. Howe, 12 November 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 2, file 11, Jones Papers,
PEIPARO.
73 J. Walter Jones to W.W. Morley, 11 December 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 46, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
74 P.A. Belanger to J. Walter Jones, 17 December 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 25, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
75 J. Walter Jones to H.F. Gordon, 18 December 1945, RG 25, series 33, subseries 3, file 45, Jones
Papers, PEIPARO.
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the two islands with a subsidy of $4500 per voyage. This amounted to a yearly
subsidy of $54,000 dedicated to the PEI-Newfoundland route, a subsidy that should
have greatly improved PEI’s ability to ship its products across the Cabot Strait.
The subsidy was granted without competition to Desmond Clarke, a Toronto-born
and Montreal-based businessman with a record of receiving federal assistance to ship
to Newfoundland and Labrador.76 With this money, Clarke founded the Inter Island
Steamship Company and began operation of the aptly-named Island Connector, a
diesel schooner that travelled the Charlottetown-St. John’s route for four years
commencing in 1946.77 F.E. Bawden, Ottawa’s director of trade routes and steamship
subsidies, justified this decision to the minister of Trade and Commerce by outlining
the substandard service that the Newfoundland Railway’s John Cabot had given to
PEI the previous year. The Newfoundland Railway’s boat, Bawden wrote, “was
frequently late, which caused considerable distress to Prince Edward Island shippers
who had their cattle and produce down on the wharf waiting in some cases several
days before the ship arrived to take them”. Dissatisfaction persisted even after Island
products were loaded on the boat. First, the John Cabot was not originally designed
to carry livestock and was therefore unable to carry as many cattle as Island exporters
wished. Second, the boat was notoriously slow, with a maximum speed of a mere
eight knots. Clarke, meanwhile, promised a new 1,000 ton-ship specifically designed
to transport livestock, with a top speed of 11 knots, which he would deliver for the
same price as was paid Newfoundland Railway for the unsatisfactory John Cabot. As
Bawden informed MacKinnon in recommending Clarke, “I know of no one else who
would be capable of handling this business . . . and this offer [of a $54,000 subsidy]
would provide a better service than has at any time been previously performed on this
route”.78 Based on this strong endorsement, MacKinnon quickly approved a four-year
contract for Clarke to provide for the Charlottetown-St. John’s route without issuing
a tender for alternative bids.
That the contract offered the Inter Island Steamship Company was to run for four
years is not without significance. As Bawden made clear in his letter to MacKinnon
endorsing Clarke, any contract that was to run for five years or longer would require
the parliamentary endorsement of an order-in-council. To receive such an
endorsement could take some time, and this would be especially true were Maritime
parliamentarians to take exception to the granting of non-tendered contract to a
central-Canadian firm without any allowance for bids from shippers situated within
their constituencies. While MacKinnon surely sped up the process by granting Clarke
a non-competitive contract, the four-year term of the deal effectively prevented
Maritime politicians from having their say in the House of Commons on the matter.
This legislative loophole did not, however, silence Maritime shipping interests.79
The granting of a subsidy for the PEI-Newfoundland route without competition
elicited a strong response from J.L. Williams, managing-director of Newfoundland
76 Clarke had operated a ship from Montreal to Corner Brook since the 1920s.
77 See Malcolm MacLeod, “Subsidized Steamers”, p. 79.
78 F.E. Bawden to J.A. MacKinnon, 31 January 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
79 See F.E. Bawden to J.A. MacKinnon, 31 January 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
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Canada Steamships Ltd. “Surely”, he protested in a 26 March 1946 letter to Bawden,
“if it is necessary to provide a subsidy for a service from Charlottetown to St. John’s
that subsidy should have been thrown open to competition”.80 A day later he sent a
telegram directly to Minister of Trade and Commerce MacKinnon explaining that his
company had operated a ship fortnightly between the islands without benefit of a
subsidy and, as a result, he felt “it most unfair government should subsidize others
against us, especially without enquiring as to our future plans regarding this route”.81
And Williams was not through; on 29 March he posted a letter to MacKinnon
reiterating his disgust with the way the process had unfolded. He was appalled that
“our own Government is negotiating a subsidy to a competitor” on a route that had
traditionally belonged to his company. Moreover, he suggested that the whole idea of
a subsidy was unnecessary, but “if the Government feels that a subsidy must be
awarded, then we ask to be allowed to compete on the same terms as others”.82
A similar sentiment was expressed by W.A. Shaw of Shaw Steamships, whose
Meigle had long serviced the Charlottetown-St. John’s route. In a fiery 22 April 1946
telegram to MacKinnon, Shaw stated that, while a subsidy might have been required
in 1942 to get the trade route running, by 1946 it was no longer needed. Moreover,
that the subsidy was offered to an “outsider” clearly rankled the Maritime shipper. In
pointed prose, he informed the minister that he did not “think the Canadian public is
going to thank you for throwing away a quarter of a million dollars to bring in a
Quebec company under a subsidy to compete with local companies who [are]
operating without subsidies”. Shaw’s Meigle was, he affirmed, “worth two Island
Connectors”, and he would prove it by providing Charlottetown better service without
a subsidy than Clarke’s brand-new ship could provide with government assistance.83
Shaw’s vow to outperform the Inter Island Steamship Company was not
braggadocio. Clarke initially had considerable difficulty in getting the Island
Connecter up and running. The big ship was supposed to be ready to ply the waters
by early May, but owing to delays at the Vancouver shipyard where it was being built,
Clarke anticipated that it would not be available until 20 May, a date well into the
spring shipping season. Even this late date proved to be overly optimistic. The Island
Connector did not begin its first Charlottetown-St. John’s trip until 5 June, although
Clarke did try to alleviate the situation by using alternative boats for two earlier
shipments.84 This inauspicious beginning seemed to set the tone for the Island
Connector and, by 18 November 1946, trade agent Agnew was writing to Bawden to
complain about the Inter Island Steamship Company’s service. To that date the Island
Connector, hampered by propeller damage that consumed two months of the summer
season, had only made nine of the promised twelve trips, and Agnew believed “it will
80 J.L. Williams to F.E. Bawden, 27 March 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
81 Newfoundland Canada Steamships Ltd. to J.A. MacKinnon, 28 March 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file
T53, LAC.
82 J.L. Williams to J.A. MacKinnon, 29 March 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
83 W.A. Shaw to J.A. MacKinnon, 22 April 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
84 The Surewater set sail on 29 April and the Keybar left Charlottetown on 16 May. See Inter Island
Steamship Co., “Limited Date of Sailings from Charlottetown to St. John’s”, RG 46, vol. 1314, file
T53, LAC.
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be impossible to make three more trips before it freezes up”.85 Agnew pointed out, by
way of comparison, that the Shaw Steamship Company had been able to make more
trips with the Meigle without benefit of a federal subsidy.
In light of the difficulties experienced over the course of the 1946 shipping season,
Agnew wrote J.A. Heenan, who had replaced Bawden as director of trade routes and
steamship subsidies in the Department of Trade and Commerce, with suggestions on
how to improve service to PEI for 1947.86 Key among his recommendations was that
the Island Connector should sail from Charlottetown every two weeks rather than
every three, at least “until freeze up”. Once winter’s icy conditions made sailing in the
Northumberland Strait impossible, the Island Connector should load PEI cattle in
Halifax “at least every three weeks, to enable us to get cattle on the market during the
Winter months”. Again, Agnew used the Meigle comparison to justify these proposed
changes: the Meigle made three more trips to Newfoundland over the course of the
1946 shipping season than did the Island Connector and, with winter’s arrival, the
Meigle began carrying Island cattle across the Cabot Strait from Halifax, a fact that
was hard for the Island government to explain to farmers and exporters struggling to
get their cattle to St. John’s. As Agnew pointedly informed Heenan: “You can readily
see the adverse criticism we are getting, when the Steamship Company receiving a
large subsidy from the Dominion Government, cannot accommodate our shippers
during the Winter months, and again, the Steamship Company without any assistance
from the Government, makes more trips during the Summer Season and carrying
cattle during the winter months”.87 This viewpoint was also shared by Premier Jones,
who advised Heenan that “the steamship Meigle, without a subsidy, is giving us much
better service” and that the Island Connector “will have to improve a great deal to
become popular”.88 In response, Heenan simply stated that the contract could not be
altered until it expired in 1949, although he did assure Jones that he would bring the
premier’s remarks to Clarke’s attention.89
It is impossible to know with certainty what Jones thought of Heenan’s reply, as
the archival record at this point runs dry. However, one can extrapolate Island
sentiment from an article published in The Maritime Farmer and Cooperative
Dairyman on the eve of Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation. “P.E. Island Sells
Newfoundland” suggests that Island farmers remained dissatisfied with the Island
Connector notwithstanding exports in 1948 of 4,516 cattle and 1,112 calves – a 46.5
per cent increase over wartime allowances. So deep was Island dissatisfaction that
William Agnew, PEI’s long-suffering trade representative in Newfoundland,
recommended that the province revisit the possibility of acquiring its own vessel for
85 W.E. Agnew to F.E. Bawden, 18 November 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC. Information on
the propeller damage suffered by the Island Connector can be found in J.A. Heenan to W.E. Agnew,
21 November 1946, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC. The Island Connector set sail for St. John’s on
July 12. Presumably the ship suffered the damage to its propeller on this trip, as it did not again sail
from Charlottetown until September 14. During the period that the Island Connector was inoperative,
the North Coaster made two trips along the route. See Inter Island Steamship Co., “Limited Date of
Sailings from Charlottetown to St. John’s”, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
86 Heenan had replaced Bawden as director of trade routes and steamship subsidies.
87 W.E. Agnew to J.A. Heenan, 28 February 1947, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
88 J. Walter Jones to J.A. Heenan, 30 April 1947, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
89 J.A. Heenan to J. Walter Jones, 3 May 1947, RG 46, vol. 1314, file T53, LAC.
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this important trade route.90 It seems that the more things changed with the PEI-
Newfoundland trade, the more they stayed the same.
In his research on federal policy with respect to the Maritimes during the Second
World War, E.R. Forbes documented Ottawa’s tendency to bow to the political might
of Montreal and favour that city’s entrepreneurs over those of the Maritime region.91
The result, he argues, was a consolidation of the economic disparity that increasingly
characterized the Maritime region in the pre-war period. Efforts by Premier Walter
Jones, by his contacts in the federal bureaucracy, and by regional MPs proved
remarkably successful in the battle to reserve the Newfoundland market for Maritime
live cattle, but the victory proved to be a hollow one because control over shipping
and government favour had eluded them. By disregarding pre-existing inter-island
connections through the provision of a subsidy without tender to the Inter Island
Steamship Company, the federal government continued this consolidation process
into the post-war era.
90 See “P.E. Island Sells Newfoundland”, The Maritime Farmer and Cooperative Dairyman, 5 April
1949, p. 3. In addition to these exports of cattle and calves, 347,241 bushels of potatoes crossed the
Cabot Strait, along with thousands of pounds of cheese, butter, fruit and vegetables as well as 27,092
sheep – a remarkable number considering that there are very few mentions of sheep in the archival
record.
91 Ernest Forbes, “Consolidating Disparity”, p. 25.
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